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Abstract 
The large-scale diffusion of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) imposes the construction 
of a sizeable CO2 pipeline infrastructure. This paper analyzes the conditions for a 
widespread adoption of CCS by a group of emitters that can be connected to a common 
pipeline system. It details a quantitative framework capable of assessing how the tariff 
structure and the regulatory constraints imposed on the pipeline operator impact the 
overall cost of CO2 abatement via CCS. This modeling framework is applied to the case 
of a real European CO2 pipeline project. We find that the obligation to use cross-subsidy-
free pipeline tariffs has a minor impact on the minimum CO2 price required to adopt the 
CCS. In contrast, the obligation to charge non-discriminatory prices can either impede the 
adoption of CCS or significantly raises that price. Besides, we compared two alternative 
regulatory frameworks for CCS pipelines: a common European organization as opposed 
to a collection of national regulations. The results indicate that the institutional scope of 
that regulation has a limited impact on the adoption of CCS compared to the detailed 
design of the tariff structure imposed to pipeline operators. 
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1. Introduction 
The current dominance of hydrocarbon fuels in the global primary energy mix is likely to persist 
in the foreseeable future, suggesting that there will be no sharp decline in the trajectory of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA, 2011). Against this daunting background, Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS)1 represents a technically conceivable option to isolate large volumes of CO2 from the 
atmosphere (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). In principle, a widespread deployment of this decarbonizing 
technology to large industrial CO2 point sources could reconcile the current world's dependence upon 
hydrocarbons with the large and rapid reduction of anthropogenic CO2 emissions required to prevent 
the dangerous effects of global warming. 
Previously, a large body of literature2 emerged with the aim of providing insights for the decision 
makers concerned by CCS (policymakers, governments, and businesses). Yet, the spatial nature of 
CCS (i.e., the fact that sources can be remotely located from geologic sequestration sites imposing the 
construction of dedicated CO2 transport systems) is surprisingly disregarded in most of these works. 
Several factors may explain this relative lack of consideration for carbon transportation issues, 
including the series of engineering-based cost estimates that typically emphasize the inexpensive 
nature of transportation compared to the other components of the CCS chain (IPCC, 2005; Al-Juaied 
and Whitmore, 2009); and the fact that, in the United States, some long-distance CO2 pipelines are 
already in operation for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) purposes (IPCC, 2005). Still, CCS experts 
repeatedly emphasize that the deployment of CCS remains contingent upon the installation of a 
sizeable CO2 transportation infrastructure with a national and possibly continental scope (de Coninck 
et al., 2009; Herzog, 2011; Flannery, 2011). 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the burgeoning analysis of the economic and 
regulatory issues connected to the ex-nihilo creation of a sizeable CO2 pipeline system. In recent years, 
there has been an upsurge in interest in the application of operations research techniques to determine 
the cost-minimizing design of an integrated CCS infrastructure network (Bakken and von Streng 
Velken, 2008; Middleton and Bielicki, 2009; Kemp and Kasim, 2010; Klokk et al., 2010; 
Mendelevitch et al., 2010; Kuby et al., 2011). While very much needed for indicative regional 
planning purposes (to organize the source-to-sink allocation), these optimization models implicitly 
posit an idealized industrial organization: a unique decision maker is supposed to have total control of 
the whole CCS chain. However, in reality, several stakeholders are likely to be involved in the 
creation of a CCS infrastructure (e.g., the emitters, the CO2 pipeline operator). This fact can hardly be 
                                                 
1
 CCS is a generic name for the combination of technologies applied in three successive stages: (1) the capture which 
consists of a separation of CO2 from the emissions stream from fossil-fuel combustion, (2) the transportation of the captured 
CO2 via a dedicated infrastructure to a storage location, and (3) the long-term storage of the CO2 within a suitable 
geological formation in a manner that ensures its long-term isolation from the atmosphere (IPCC, 2005). 
2
 A tentative and non-exhaustive clustering of these contributions includes: (i) the applications of top-down dynamic models 
to contrast the relative performances of policy instruments and to check their influence on the adoption of CCS (Gerlagh and 
van der Zwaan, 2006; Grimaud et al., 2011); (ii) the detailed bottom-up analyses on the future prospects for CCS (Kemp and 
Kasim, 2008; Golombek et al., 2011; Lohwasser and Madlener, 2012); (iii) the investment analyses applying the real-option 
approach to CCS projects (Yang et al., 2008; Eckhause, 2011; Eckhause and Herold, 2012)...  
3 
overlooked: according to the policy discussion in Herzog (2011, p.600), an inappropriate coordination 
of these individual decisions can impede the massive deployment of CCS.3 In this paper, we explicitly 
focus on these coordination issues.  
The theoretical basis of our approach stems from a club theory perspective (Buchanan, 1965). 
Accordingly, the CO2 emitter's decision to install or to not install capture equipment can be viewed as 
the outcome of a voluntary application of a “CCS club” aimed at aggregating the emissions captured 
in a given industrial cluster to generate economies of scale in the construction and subsequent 
operation of a joint CO2 transportation infrastructure. More specifically, our aim is to test the condition 
for a large voluntary adoption of CCS as a function of the CO2 transportation technology, the nature of 
the tariffs regulation imposed on the pipeline operator, the other CCS costs, and the economic 
incentives that set the price of CO2 emissions (either through a tax or a cap-and-trade system).  
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we provide an adapted modeling framework 
that analyzes the coordination issue at hand with the help of cooperative game theoretic 
considerations. Second, we consider an application of the proposed framework to the case of a realistic 
European CCS project4. This allows us to present a series of original empirical findings that clarify the 
interactions between the nature of the tariff structure used in the CO2 pipeline industry and the 
minimum price of the CO2 emission allowances required to construct that infrastructure. In particular, 
these findings confirm that spatial issues (the emitter's locations) significantly narrow the choice of a 
pipeline tariff structure: any kind of uniform postage stamp tariff impedes the adoption of CCS, 
whereas geographical discrimination is more effective. In the latter case, poorly defined tariffs 
significantly raise the minimum CO2 price required to adopt the CCS. Moreover, our modeling 
framework can be used to compare two alternative organizations for the regulation of CO2 pipelines: a 
regulation designed at the EU-level and a collection of national-based regulations. Our findings 
indicate that an integrated European regulation is preferable to ease the deployment of that carbon 
removal technology. Yet, the choice of the institutional scope of the pipeline regulation (national vs. 
European) seems less important for the adoption of CCS than the detailed decisions related to the tariff 
structure imposed to pipeline operators.  
This paper also has a practical approach: it is intended to provide valuable guidance for 
professionals and scholars interested in the regulation of CO2 pipeline systems and more generally for 
the public decision makers who have to calibrate on the economic incentives (either a tax or a cap-
and-trade system) aimed at promoting the transition to a low-carbon economy. Therefore, a great 
                                                 
3
 Herzog (2011, p. 600) attributes the lack of deployment of CO2 pipeline systems to what he casually depicts as a “chicken 
and egg” problem: on the one hand, a transportation infrastructure is required to foster the deployment of carbon capture 
equipments in a given area but, on the other hand, a critical flow of captured CO2 is needed to justify the construction of the 
infrastructure. 
4
 This project assumes the construction of a CO2 trunkline aimed at collecting 19.7 millions of tons of CO2 per year 
(MtCO2/year) captured by 14 small to large-size industrial facilities located in both Le Havre (France) and Antwerp 
(Belgium), and transporting this CO2 to the Rotterdam area (Netherlands), where it can be stored in depleted oil fields in the 
North Sea. This sizeable project could represent one of the first attempts to build a transnational CO2 pipeline system in 
Continental Europe.  
4 
attention has been paid to address the practical issues faced in the implementation of the proposed 
methodology.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief engineering-inspired overview of 
the CO2 pipelines technology with the aim to detail the problem's background. Section 3 presents a 
cooperative game theoretic model of the adoption of pipeline transport of CO2. Then, Section 4 details 
an application of this methodology to the case of a real European project. Finally, the last section 
offers a summary and some concluding remarks. For the sake of clarity, all the mathematical proofs 
are presented in Appendix A. 
2. CO2 pipeline systems: background 
Recently, a series of engineering analyses have been conducted to model the economics of simple 
point-to-point pipeline systems capable of transporting a given steady flow rate of CO2 across a given 
distance (e.g., McCoy and Rubin, 2008; McCoy, 2009). These studies detail an exhaustive, 
engineering-based, representation of the CO2 pipeline technology5 and put that representation to work 
to determine the cost-minimizing design of a given CO2 pipeline infrastructure (the pipeline diameter; 
the number and the size of the compression equipments installed along the pipeline).  
From an engineering perspective, McCoy and Rubin (2008) underlined that their equations differ 
from those used in the natural gas industry as they pointed out the differences in the fluids' physical 
properties (natural gas is typically transported in a gaseous state whereas CO2 is piped in supercritical 
state). Yet, from a conceptual perspective, their approach bears a strong analogy with those typically 
used in the natural gas industry. As far as natural gas pipelines are concerned, a prolific literature6 
stemmed from Chenery's (1949) seminal contribution has combined engineering and economics to 
guide both investment and operational decisions. Using that analogy, one may describe the CO2 
pipeline technology as an engineering production function that has two inputs: (i) energy (to power the 
pumping equipment) and (ii) capital (to install a pipeline and the pumping equipment), which can be 
combined in varying proportions to transport a given future flow of CO2. In the long-run, the CO2 
planner's problem amounts to finding the cost-minimizing combination of inputs compatible with this 
engineering production function.  
Regarding point-to-point CO2 pipelines, the numerical simulations based on these engineering 
models consistently indicate that the technology at hand exhibits significant increasing returns to scale 
                                                 
5
 A comprehensive presentation of these engineering considerations is beyond the scope of this paper, yet we can note that 
these studies typically includes: (i) a thermodynamic-derived flow equation that describes the frictional loss of energy 
through the pipe (i.e. the pressure drop) as a function of the fluid's physical properties (flow-rate, pressure, temperature...) 
and engineering parameters (the pipeline length, its diameter, an empirically determined friction coefficient...); (ii) the 
mechanical constraints related to the pipeline's maximum operating pressure; and (ii) the equation governing the power 
required to compress the CO2 from a given inlet pressure to a predefined outlet pressure.  
6
 The list includes: (i) the analytical studies dedicated to the simple point-to-point infrastructure that uses a single 
compressor equipment (Chenery, 1949; Massol, 2011); (ii) those dedicated to long-distance trunkline systems that have a 
series of compressor stations installed along the pipeline (André and Bonnans, 2011); and (iii) the numerous applications of 
mathematical programming to model meshed transmission networks (e.g., André et al., 2009). 
5 
over a large range of output in the long run (IPCC, 2005; McCoy and Rubin, 2008; McCoy, 2009) 
which is also coherent with the findings obtained using the natural gas analogue (Chenery, 1949; 
Massol, 2011). From an industrial organization perspective, this finding has important implications as 
these economies of scale represent an incentive for the construction of a sizeable pipeline 
infrastructure aimed at serving the needs of a large group of CCS adopters. Ex ante, an emitter located 
near the inlet of the CO2 pipeline who voluntary adopts CCS could benefit from the wide participation 
of the other emitters located in the neighborhood. That's the reason why, we aim to study the creation 
of a private good club à la Sorenson et al. (1978).7 Our goal is to explore the relations between the 
tariff policy adopted by the pipeline operator, and the voluntarily adhesion of the CO2 emitters. As the 
CO2 pipeline tariffs are likely to be subject to some kind of regulation, this exploration is of major 
importance to provide useful guidance to both regulators and policy makers.  
3. A game-theoretic approach to infrastructure pricing 
In this section, we present the analytical framework used in the sequel of the manuscript. To 
begin with, we clarify the notation. Then, we analyze the economics of a common CO2 pipeline 
infrastructure successively using a cost-sharing and a benefit-sharing perspective. This analysis allows 
us to clarify the connections between both approaches. Lastly, we show how the tariff structure used 
by the pipeline operator influences the minimal price of the CO2 emission allowance required to obtain 
an incentive-compatible allocation of the total benefit generated by the construction of that 
infrastructure. 
3.1 Background and main notation 
We consider the construction of a pipeline system aimed at transporting the CO2 emitted by a 
finite set of existing industrial facilities. Let N  denote the finite set of emitters that can be connected 
to the CO2 pipeline system, indexed by subscript i . Let N  denote the cardinality of this set and S  
denote a subset of N . Each industrial facility has a series of specific features (e.g., location, flows of 
CO2). Thus, it is convenient to associate each emitter with a specific transportation service. So, N  is 
also the set of goods provided by the CO2 pipeline industry. 
In this paper, we abstract from the level of CO2 captured at each industrial facility that may 
potentially adopt the CCS technology. Accordingly, we simply assume a binary decision that concerns 
whether or not the amount of CO2 generated by each industrial facility is captured. Let iQ  denote the 
annual volume CO2 emitted by i  that can potentially be captured. Additionally, each emitter i  is 
assumed to be endowed with iQ  emission allowances.8 If the CCS technology is adopted, these 
                                                 
7
 We also refer to Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) for a comprehensive definition of a club good. 
8
 Thus, each emitter is endowed with an amount of emission allowances that is exactly equal to its annual emissions. This 
assumption is consistent with the “grandfathering” allocation of emission allowances (i.e. the distribution free of charge to 
polluting industries based on historical data on emissions or fuel use) observed during Phases I and II of the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).One natural way to relax this assumption would consist of assuming that part of 
6 
allowances will be sold. Emitters are assumed to be price takers on the market for allowances. 
Hereafter, the selling price of an emission allowance is an exogenous parameter that is simply denoted 
2CO
p .  
The costs related to both capture and storage operations are separable. Let iχ  denote the 
levelized unit cost of the site-specific, carbon capture operations conducted at industrial facility i ; and 
σ  denote the price of the storage service provided by an independent storage operator.9 For each 
emitter, the capture and storage costs are only incurred if the CCS technology were to be adopted. 
Thus, ( )2CO i ip Qχ σ− −  represents the willingness to pay for CO2 pipeline service of industrial 
facility i . 
Entry is assumed to be free in the CO2 pipeline industry. The discussion in the preceding section 
suggests that the technology used in CO2 pipelines is not proprietary. Thus, we assume that all the 
pipeline firms potentially have access to the same technology and therefore have the same cost 
function. Let C  be a finite real-valued function on the subsets of N . Here, ( )C S  denotes the stand-
alone, long-run cost of a pipeline system gauged to transport the CO2 emitted by the subset S . In the 
empirical section of this paper, the 2 N  values taken by the function C  will correspond to the 
numerical outcomes of an engineering process model.10 We assume that ( ) 0C ∅ =  and ( ) 0C S ≥  
for any non-empty S  in N . 
3.2 A cost-based analysis: are we facing a sustainable natural monopoly? 
To begin with, we focus on the cost structure of the CO2 pipeline industry and analyze whether or 
not a monopolistic organization can sustainably be implemented in that industry. Two items are 
successively discussed: the sub-additivity of the cost function and the sustainability of a natural 
monopoly. 
Sub-additivity 
To check whether the pipeline industry that serves these N  emitters is a natural monopoly or 
not, one has to verify the sub-additivity of the cost function. 
A cost function C  is sub-additive if ( ) ( ) ( )C S T C S C T∪ ≤ +  for any coalitions ,S T N⊆ , 
with S T∩ = ∅ . In case of a sub-additive cost function, no combination of multiple firms can 
                                                                                                                                                        
the initial allowances should be bought on a primary market, before the surplus allowances may be sold on a secondary 
market. Apart from the issue of making coherent assumptions regarding the carbon prices on the two markets, accounting for 
this would add a fixed cost to the welfare of each emitter. This, in turn, would lower the threshold CO2 price necessary to 
ensure each emitter joins the club. 
9
 σ may also be interpreted as a levelized unit cost of storage. 
10
 As there is no global information available about the shape of that cost function beyond these 2 N  local evaluations, it 
should be clear that we cannot use the arsenal of useful results obtained in the analytical literature dedicated to continuous 
multiproduct cost functions (e.g., Baumol, 1977; Sharkey, 1982). 
7 
collectively produce the industry output at lower cost than a monopolist (Berg and Tschirhart, 1988). 
Thus, a pipeline operator that serves these N  emitters with a sub-additive cost function is said to be a 
natural monopoly.11 
Sustainability 
Given that entry is supposed to be free in the CO2 pipeline industry, one has to take into 
consideration the possible entry of a potential rival firm. Following Baumol et al. (1977), a 
monopolistic organization is reputed sustainable for that industry if there exists a revenue vector 
( )'1,..., Nr r r=  so that: (i) a monopoly that serves the entire market and charges these revenues is 
financially viable, and (ii) a potential entrant cannot find any financially viable opportunity to serve 
any market S  with S N⊆ . Formally, these conditions for a sustainable monopoly are: 
( )N
i N
r C N
∈
≥          (1) 
( )S
i S
r C S
∈
≤ ,  S N∀ ⊆        (2) 
Thus, even in the absence of a regulatory profit constraint, these conditions jointly demand the 
sustainable monopoly to adopt a revenue vector r  that exactly recovers the total cost (Sharkey, 1982): 
( )N
i N
r C N
∈
= .          (3) 
The conditions (2) and (3) are related to the conditions for subsidy-free revenues proposed by 
Faulhaber (1975) that insure that no set of customers pays more for service than their stand-alone cost 
(i.e., the cost to exclusively serve that group of customers). In the game-theoretic jargon, any revenue 
vector r  that verifies these constraints is a cost allocation that belongs to the core of the cost game 
( ),N C , i.e., the set: 
( ) ( ): :  and, ,N i i
i N i S
r r C N S N r C S
∈ ∈
 Λ = ∈ = ∀ ⊂ ≤ 
 
  .     (4) 
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for a sustainable monopoly is a non-empty set Λ . 
From an empirical perspective, the conditions (4) can be checked using the following linear program:  
                                                 
11
 Testing the global sub-additivity of that cost function is computationally demanding as a total of  ( )( )1 2 2N jNj j= −  
conditions, where ( )Nj  is the number of j-combinations from a given set N , have to be considered. From an empirical 
perspective, checking the sub-additive nature of a discrete cost function can be challenging (e.g., with a moderate size of 
N =20 facilities, nearly 3.5 billion conditions must be verified). Yet, for small enough problems such as the one considered 
in the next section, an exhaustive enumeration of all these conditions remains computationally feasible. 
8 
LP1: 
,
Max
r ε
 ε          (5) 
s.t. ( )i
i N
r C N
∈
= ,        (6) 
( )i
i S
r C Sε
∈
+ ≤ ,  { }\ ,S N N∀ ⊂ ∅ ,   (7) 
0ε ≥ .         (8) 
The gain derived from cooperation by any non-trivial coalitions S N⊂  ( ),S N≠ ∅  with 
respect to a cost allocation r
 
is measured by the excess: ( ) ii SC S r∈ 	−
  . In LP1, the non-negative 
variable ε  can be interpreted as the maximum possible value of the lowest excess obtained by a non-
trivial coalition. Obviously, a non-empty feasible set for the program LP1 is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for sustainability (i.e., it proves the existence of a non-empty core Λ ).  
3.3 Taking revenues into account: a benefit game 
The cost-based perspective discussed in the previous subsection provides useful insights to the 
sustainability of a natural monopoly. Yet, this approach does not take into consideration the emitter's 
decisions to adopt CCS technology as a whole.  
So, we now think of emitters as potential members of a club gathering the CO2 pipeline users 
(i.e., the CCS adopters). We adopt a game theoretic specification based on Littlechild (1975) and 
Sharkey (1982) and assume that the emitters are interested in maximizing the difference between 
benefits and total costs of CCS (i.e., the net benefits which they receive). The game at hand is a 
transferable utility game. For each club with members S , the voluntary non-participation of some 
members may be needed to maximize the net benefits collectively attained by that club. Thus, the 
characteristic function for the game, denoted v , gives for each coalition of players S , the net benefits 
for the sub-coalition players in S  which maximizes this difference: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2, MaxCO CO i i
R S i R
v S p p Q C Rχ σ
⊆ ∈
  	= − − − 
  
 ,  S N∀ ⊆ .  (9) 
If no CO2 is captured, then no costs are incurred which indicates that ( )2, 0COv S p ≥  for all S . 
By construction, v  is monotonic since the condition ( ) ( )2 2, ,CO COv R p v S p≤  systematically holds 
for any pair of subsets R , S  in N  with R S⊂ .  
9 
The definition (9) indicates that v  is parameterized by the price of an emission allowance. Thus, 
this price conditions the voluntary adoption of CCS by all the emitters in the grand coalition N . The 
necessary and sufficient condition for all the emitters in N  to adopt the CCS technology is that the 
total benefit of any club with members S  must be at least as large as the incremental cost of 
transporting the CO2 captured by the emitters in S  (Sharkey, 1982): 
( ) ( ) ( )2 \CO i i
i S
p Q C N C N Sχ σ
∈
 	
− − ≥ −
  ,  S N∀ ⊂ .  (10) 
Hence, for any club with members S , the condition (10) holds if and only if the price of an 
emission allowance is larger than the sum of the volume-weighted average unit capture costs, the unit 
incremental cost to connect the club members to a pipeline system serving the other emitters, and the 
unit storage cost. Gathering all these conditions indicates that any carbon price 
2CO
p  lower than the 
threshold level: 
( ) ( )
2
\
Min
i i
i S
CO S N
i
i S
Q C N C N S
p Q
χ
σ∈
⊂
∈
 + −
 
= + 
 
 


,     (11) 
cannot be compatible with the voluntary sequestration of the total volume of CO2 emitted by the grand 
coalition. As a consequence, the promoters of a CO2 pipeline project should not consider connecting 
all these emitters if that minimum price is not attained. 
Hereafter, we assume that 
2 2CO CO
p p≥  so that all the emitters are willing to be connected to the 
CO2 pipeline system. We now analyze the repartition of the total benefit obtained by the grand 
coalition – i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )2 2, CO CO i ii Nv N p p Q C Nχ σ∈  	= − − −
   – among the players. Let the 
vector ( )'1,..., Ny y y=  with ( )2,i COi N y v N p∈ =  denote an allocation of the total benefit, and the 
set ( )2COpΓ
 
 denote the core of the net benefit game ( )
2
,
COp
N v , i.e., 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2: : ,  and, , ,NCO i CO i CO
i N i S
p y y v N p S N y v S p
∈ ∈
 Γ = ∈ = ∀ ⊂ ≥ 
 
  .   (12) 
By definition, choosing an allocation y  in the core insures that the cooperation within the largest 
possible club N  is unanimously preferred to any other smaller club S . Thus, any y  in ( )2COpΓ  is 
an incentive-compatible allocation for the club N . 
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3.4 Reconciling the cost-based and the benefit-based approaches 
We shall now reconcile the two previous perspectives in a common direction. For any individual 
emitter i , there exists a one-to-one correspondence between its allocated share iy  of the total net 
benefit and the amount ir  charged by the pipeline operator:  
( )2i CO i i iy p Q rχ σ= − − − ,    i N∀ ∈ .    (13)  
We use this relation parameterized by the price of an emission allowance to define the function 
2, COi p
F  that verifies ( )
2, COi i p i
y F r=  and ( )
2
1
, COi i p i
r F y−= . For the sake of brevity, we simply use 
( )
2COp
F r  (respectively ( )
2
1
COp
F y− ) as a vector notation for ( )( )
2
1
,
1,...,CO
i p i
i N
F y−
=
 (respectively 
( )( )
2
1
,
1,...,CO
i p i
i N
F y−
=
). 
As clarified by Sharkey (1982), the conditions for sustainable prices and those for an incentive-
compatible allocation of the total net benefit obtained by the grand coalition are closely related:  
Proposition 1 (Sharkey, 1982): If ( )2COy p∈Γ  and 2 2CO COp p≥ , then ( )21COpF y− ∈ Λ . 
The result stated in Proposition 1 clearly indicates that it may not be sufficient for the pipeline 
operator to pick any revenue vector r  in Λ  the core of the cost game. Indeed, any revenue vector 
r ∈ Λ  is necessary and sufficient to avoid cross-subsidies and to impede the entry of potential rivals. 
Yet, such a vector does not necessarily provide an impetus for the voluntary adoption of the CCS 
technology by all the emitters in the grand coalition. To overcome this problem, the pipeline operator 
must also take into consideration the conditions for an incentive-compatible allocation of the net 
benefits generated by the transportation infrastructure: i.e., pick a revenue vector r  that verifies 
( ) ( )22COp COF r p∈Γ . 
Is the core of the net benefit game non-empty? From a practitioner's perspective, this is a chief 
preoccupation. Unfortunately, a linear programming approach similar to the one detailed in LP1 is 
likely to be cursed by the dimension of the problem at hand. Indeed, the value function v  as defined in 
(9) raises some computational issues as, for each of the 2 2N −  non-trivial coalitions S  that can be 
formed in N , this definition requires to determine a maximum over a discrete set that has 2 S  
elements. Even at moderate values of N , plugging all these ( )1 2N jNj j= conditions within a single 
linear program generates a very large problem... To overcome this difficulty, we now present a couple 
of analytical contributions that simplify the problem at hand.  
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Lemma 1:  The core of the net benefit game ( )2COpΓ  is equal to the set ( )2COpϒ  
where: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2
1
: : ,  and, , .
N
N
CO i CO i CO i i
i i S i S
p y y v N p S N y p Q C Sχ σ+
= ∈ ∈
   	ϒ = ∈ = ∀ ⊂ ≥ − − − 
   
  
 
This result considerably reduces the number of conditions to be verified12 to check whether a 
given allocation of the net benefit generated by the CO2 pipeline infrastructure is or not an incentive-
compatible one. Besides, Proposition 2 can be used to formulate another interesting result:  
Proposition 2: If 
2 2CO CO
p p≥ , then choosing a sustainable revenue vector r  – i.e., 
r ∈ Λ  – that allocates a non-negative net benefit to any individual emitters in the grand 
coalition – i.e., ( ){ }
2
: 0
CO
N
pr r F r∈ ∈ ≥  so that the emitters' individual 
participation constraints are verified – is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
implementing an incentive-compatible allocation of the total net benefit generated by 
the infrastructure. In short, for any 
2CO
p  with 
2 2CO CO
p p≥ , we have 
( ){ }( ) ( )22 2: 0CO CONp p COF r F r pΛ ∩ ∈ ≥ = Γ .  
In Section 3.2, we discussed the existence of sustainable revenue vectors and proposed an 
empirical approach to test for the non-empty nature of the set Λ . Now we assume that this test 
concluded that Λ ≠ ∅ 13 and consider the following linear programming problem:    
LP2: 
2,
Min
COr p
 
2CO
p           (14) 
s.t. r ∈ Λ ,          (15) 
 ( ) ( ){ }2 2 2, , : 0CONCO CO pr p r p F r+∈ ∈ ∈ ≥  .    (16) 
                                                 
12
 Indeed, the right-hand side of the 2 1N −   inequalities used in the definition of ( )
2CO
pϒ  are all known and easy to 
evaluate whereas those used in the definition of ( )
2CO
pΓ  impose either to precompute all the values of ( )
2
, COv S p  using 
the definition (9) or to use a "brute force" approach that consists in remarking that for any S  in N , we have the logical 
equivalence ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
, ,i CO i CO i i
i S i S i R
y v S p y p Q C R R Sχ σ
∈ ∈ ∈
≥ ⇔ ≥ − − − ∀ ⊆ 	  	 	
    
  
 
    and thus replace the 
first inequality by the logically equivalent 2 1S −  conditions.  
13
 Obviously, if the conclusion of that preliminary test were Λ = ∅ , there is no need to pursue the analysis as the creation of 
a unique infrastructure aimed at serving all the emitters in the grand coalition cannot constitute a sustainable solution. 
Hence, there cannot exist any rationale for the creation of a club gathering all these emitters.  
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In that linear program, the constraints (15) compel the pipeline operator to charge a sustainable 
revenue vector and the condition (16) represents the emitters' individual participation constraints.  
The following proposition insures that a solution exists and that this solution is compatible with 
the condition for the voluntary adoption of CCS by all the emitters in the grand coalition N .  
Proposition 3: If Λ ≠ ∅ , then there exists a solution to the problem LP2 that is denoted 
( )2* *, COr p . Additionally, we have 2 2*CO COp p≥  .  
By definition, any allowance price that is strictly lower than 
2
*
COp  cannot be compatible with the 
existence of an incentive-compatible repartition of the net benefits generated by the adoption of the 
CCS technology by the grand coalition (in other words, the existence of a non-empty core ( )2COpΓ ). 
Interestingly, Proposition 3 indicates that 
2 2
*
CO COp p≥ . So, the condition for a non-empty core for the 
net benefit game is more restrictive than the condition (10) required to have 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2, CO CO i ii Nv N p p Q C Nχ σ∈  	= − − −
  . 
As a result, 
2
*
COp  represents the minimum level of allowance price that has to be imperatively 
attained to convince both the pipeline operator and the emitters to capture all the volumes of CO2 
emitted by the grand coalition.  
3.5 On the relation between pipeline tariffs and the price of an emission allowance   
In the linear program LP2, we implicitly allowed the pipeline operator to discriminate the tariffs 
charged to emitters. Such a perfect discrimination hardly looks realistic. For example, in Europe the 
tariff structure used by infrastructure operators is usually subject to approval by a regulator that 
typically imposes a non-discriminatory tariff policy. A series of crucial questions emerge. First, is the 
proposed tariff structure compatible with the conditions for an incentive-compatible allocation of the 
total net benefit generated by the CO2 pipeline system? Second, in case of a positive answer to the 
previous question, does this tariff structure impose a minimum allowance price greater than the level 
2
*
COp ? 
Our framework can be put to work to analyze how a given tariff structure interacts with the 
emitters' decision to adopt the CCS technology. Formally, compelling the operator to implement a 
certain tariff structure amounts to adding some further constraints and some further decision variables 
in the LP2 linear program. In the sequel of this section, two types of tariffs structure are discussed: a 
linear tariff and a menu of linear tariffs.  
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a – A non-discriminatory, multipart, linear tariff structure 
The first type of pricing scheme corresponds to a possibly multipart, non-discriminatory, linear 
tariff whereby the pipeline operator considers a series of k , with k N≤ , emitter-specific 
quantitative features (e.g., the annual volume of CO2 emissions, the peak emission flow). Let the 
vector ( )'1 ,...,i i ikφ φ φ=  denote the value of these parameters for emitter i ; and the vector 
( )'1,..., kt t t=  denote the associated tariffs charged by the pipeline operator. For simplicity, we also 
denote Φ  the ( )N k×  matrix where the row i  is ( )'iφ . Thus, the revenue vector r  charged by the 
pipeline operator is given by r t= Φ .  
To analyze whether this tariff structure verifies the conditions for an incentive-compatible 
allocation of the total benefit generated by the CO2 pipeline system, we use a modified version of the 
preceding linear program. From the structure of LP2, we introduce the vector t  of k  additional 
decision variables and the additional restrictions imposed by the tariff structure to obtain the linear 
program LP3: 
LP3: 
2, ,
Min
COr t p
 
2CO
p           (17) 
s.t. r ∈ Λ ,          (18) 
 ( ) ( ){ }2 2 2, , : 0CONCO CO pr p r p F r+∈ ∈ ∈ ≥  ,    (19) 
( ) { }, , :N kr t r t r t∈ ∈ ∈ = Φ  .      (20) 
Any attempt to solve this problem results in one of the three following outcomes:  
 Case #1: there is no solutions to LP3, which means that the feasible set associated with LP3 is 
empty. Recall that there is no maximum bound on the carbon price in LP3. So, a sufficiently 
large value of 
2CO
p  can conceivably insure that none of the emitters' individual participation 
constraints in (19) is binding. Thus, the empty nature of the feasible set has to deal with both 
the condition (18) for a subsidy-free revenue vector and the condition (20) related to the tariff 
structure. In other words, it means that the pipeline tariff structure at hand imposes some cross-
subsidizations among customers. If entry were set free in the CO2 pipeline industry, imposing 
such a tariff structure would impede the construction of a CCS pipeline system serving the 
grand coalition of emitters (because it creates the conditions for a profitable entry for a 
competitor serving a subset of emitters).  
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 Case #2: a solution is found and corresponds to a minimum allowance price 
2
**
COp  that verifies 
2 2
** *
CO COp p= . Obviously, such a result indicates that the tariffs structure imposed to the pipeline 
operator amounts to choosing an incentive-compatible distribution of the total benefit generated 
by that infrastructure. The tariff policy has no impact on the feasibility of the CCS project.  
 Case #3: a solution is found and corresponds to a minimum allowance price 
2
**
COp  that verifies 
2 2
** *
CO COp p> . In that case, the tariffs structure imposed on the pipeline operator impedes the 
creation of the largest CCS infrastructure when the climate policy results in an allowance price 
that is in the interval  )2 2* **,CO COp p
 .  
b – A menu of multi-part affine tariff structure 
The second type of tariffs corresponds to a so-called second degree price discrimination scheme. 
The pipeline operator is allowed to design a menu of m  multipart (i.e., at least two-part) affine tariffs. 
Knowing that menu, emitters are then assumed to choose the tariff that minimizes their CO2 
transportation cost given their emission features. 
Formally, for each tariff l  with { }1,...,l m∈ , the pipeline operator considers the emitter-specific 
vector ( )'1 ,...,i i ikφ φ φ=  of quantitative features and determines a total of 1k +  parameters: the vector 
( )'1 ,...,l l lkt t t=  of k  unit prices plus the fixed charge lf . To avoid indeterminacy we impose the 
following restriction: ( )1m k N+ ≤ . For simplicity, we use t  as a short notation for the collection of 
these m  price vectors and f  for the associated fixed charges.  
In that case, each emitter i  is assumed to rationally select the tariff that minimizes its CO2 
transportation cost. This choice in turn determines the revenue charged by the pipeline operator. Thus, 
we are dealing with a bilevel optimization problem (Bard, 1998) where the upper level problem is 
analogue to LP3 (determining the minimum price of CO2 that is compatible with an incentive-
compatible menu of tariffs), and the lower-level problem corresponds to the emitters' individual 
decisions.  
Regarding the lower-level, the maximum revenue charged by the pipeline operator to each 
emitter is clearly equal to the emitter's minimum CO2 transportation cost. Formally, each emitter's 
choice can be modeled using the following linear program:  
( )LP4 , :i f t  
Max
ir
 ir           (21) 
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s.t. 'l i lir f tφ≤ + ,     { }1,...,l m∀ ∈ .   (22) 
Regarding the upper-level, we are looking for the minimum selling price of an emission 
allowance and the associated tariff design that insures an incentive-compatible allocation of the total 
net benefit.  
BLP5  
2, , ,
Min
COr f t p
 
2CO
p          (23) 
s.t. r ∈ Λ ,          (24) 
 ( ) ( ){ }2 2 2, , : 0CONCO CO pr p r p F r+∈ ∈ ∈ ≥  ,    (25) 
 ( ) ( )( ){ }, , , , :  ,  ArgMax LP4 ,N m m k i ir f t r f t i N r f t×∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∈   . (26) 
From a computational perspective, a reformulation is needed to solve this two-level optimization 
problem. To begin with, we focus on the lower-level problem faced by a given emitter i . Denoting 
( )'1 ,...,i i imα α α=  the vector of dual variables associated with the constraints (22), the KKT 
conditions for optimality correspond to the following linear complementarity constraints: 
1
1 0
m
i
l
l
α
=
− =           (27) 
( )' 0l i lir f tφ− + ≤ ,     0ilα ≥ ,     ( )( )' 0i l i ll ir f tα φ− + = ,        { }1,...,l m∀ ∈ . (28) 
We can replace the complementarity conditions (28) by integer restrictions in the form of 
disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981). We introduce: ( )'1 ,...,i i imδ δ δ=  a vector of 
binary variables such that a value 1ilδ =  indicates that the particular tariff ( ),l lf t  minimizes the CO2 
transportation cost of emitter i ; and M  a constant with a value that is large enough for the problem at 
hand.14 Using these variables, the complementarity constraints (28) becomes: 
( ) ( )'1 0i l i ll iM r f tδ φ− − ≤ − + ≤ ,  { }1,...,l m∀ ∈ ,    (29) 
0i il lMδ α≥ ≥ ,     { }1,...,l m∀ ∈ .    (30) 
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 For example, in the present case, one can rationally presume that the difference between the amount paid by an emitter for 
its CO2 transportation service (and thus the revenue charged to him) and the amount that he would have paid if that emitter 
had chosen the worst tariffs offered by the pipeline operator will be smaller than, let say, two times the overall cost of the 
entire pipeline. Hence, the value ( )2M C N= ×  looks like a possible candidate.  
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Replacing the condition (26) by the constraints (27), (29) and (30) transforms the two-level 
optimization program BLP5 into an easy-to-solve mixed-integer linear program MILP6:  
MILP6: 
2, , , , ,
Min
COr f t p α δ
 
2CO
p          (31) 
s.t. r ∈ Λ ,          (32) 
 ( ) ( ){ }2 2 2, , : 0CONCO CO pr p r p F r+∈ ∈ ∈ ≥  ,    (33) 
 ( ), , , ,r f t α δ ∈Ω ,        (34) 
where, α  is the collection of N  vectors of dual variables, δ  is the collection of N  vectors of 
binary variables, and Ω  is the set:  
{ }
{ }
( ) ( )( )
1
'
, , , , 0,1 :
: , 0,and, 1,..., ,
1 0,  and  0
N mN N mm m k
m
i
i l
l
i l i l i i
l i l l
r f t
i N r l m
M r f t M
α δ
α
δ φ δ α
×××
=
 
 ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
 
 Ω = ∀ ∈ − = ∀ ∈ 

 
 	 	
− − ≤ − + ≤ ≥ ≥ 
   

   
.  (35) 
As in the case of LP3, any attempt to solve the mixed-integer linear program MILP6 results in 
one of the three following outcomes:  
 Case #1: there is no solution to MILP6 which indicates that the feasible set is empty. Again, it 
means that the constraints (34) related to the tariffs structure imposed on the pipeline operator 
are not compatible with the conditions (32) for a cross-subsidy-free revenue. 
 Case #2: a solution is found and corresponds to a minimum allowance price 
2
**
COp  that verifies 
2 2
** *
CO COp p= . Obviously, such a result indicates the tariff policy has no impact on the feasibility 
of the CCS project. 
 Case #3: a solution is found and corresponds to a minimum allowance price 
2
**
COp  that verifies 
2 2
** *
CO COp p> . Again, the regulation imposed on the pipeline operator impedes the creation of 
the largest CCS infrastructure when the climate policy results in an allowance price that is in 
the interval  )2 2* **,CO COp p
 .  
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4. Case study 
In this section, we detail an application of the proposed framework to analyze the economics of a 
given CO2 pipeline system and examine the conditions for the deployment of that CCS chain. 
4.1 A Northwestern European CO2 pipeline project 
a - Background 
In this article, we consider a realistic case study inspired by the context of the EU-funded 
COCATE project:15 the construction of a high-pressure CO2 trunkline system aimed at gathering the 
CO2 emissions originating from two large industrial clusters – Le Havre (France) and Antwerp 
(Belgium) – and transporting them to the Rotterdam area (Netherlands) where the CO2 could be stored 
offshore in depleted oil fields.16  
Figure 1. A picture of the North-Western European CO2 pipeline project 
France
Belgium
NL
Germany
Lux.
Le Havre
Antwerp
Rotterdam
Cluster 1: Le Havre
12 industrial facilities   
(12.6 MtCO2 per year)
1 Coal power plant (1,450 MW) 
2 Refineries
1 Fertilizer plant
1 Cement factory
1 Glass container factory
1 Chemical  plant 
1 Compressor test platform 
3 Petrochemical plants
1 Ethanol plant
Cluster 2: Antwerp
2 industrial facilities     
(7.1 MtCO2 per year)
2 Refineries
 
 
Using both the French and Belgian National Allocation Plans for CO2-emission allowances, a 
total of 14 large to small industrial facilities (coal power plant, refineries, petrochemical plants...) have 
been identified as possible CCS adopters in these two clusters (cf. Figure 1 for an illustration). These 
14 plants jointly emit 19.7 MtCO2/year and together constitute the largest coalition that is denoted 
AllN . 
                                                 
15
 The COCATE project was funded by the European Commission (DG Research) under the reference: 7th Framework 
Program, Energy.2009.5.2.2: Towards an infrastructure for CO2 transport and storage. Collaborative Project – GA No. 
241381 (cf. http://projet.ifpen.fr/Projet/jcms/c_7832  for a presentation). 
16
 These large volumes of CO2 could also be used for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) operations as there exists some plans 
for large scale CO2-based EOR operations in the North Sea (Tzimas et al., 2005).  
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We now review three important features that differentiate the CO2 transportation service 
potentially demanded by each industrial facility. First, location obviously matters. To simplify, the 
subset of Belgian (respectively French) emitters is denoted B  (respectively F ).  
Table 1. The annual volumes of CO2 emitted by the industrial facilities 

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Note: The use of generic labels has been imposed by legal confidentiality provisions. The annual emissions data are based 
on 2010 figures listed in the Belgian and French National Allocation Plans for CO2-emission allowances. The quarterly 
shares have been obtained from industry-specific engineering studies. The annual unit costs are in 2010 euros. They are 
based on proprietary engineering studies available at IFP Énergies Nouvelles. These figures correspond to a cost evaluation 
based on an "nth of a kind" assumption (i.e., cost engineers have assumed a widespread diffusion of the capture 
technologies allowing for substantial learning and thus significant cost reductions).  
Second, there are significant differences in the annual volume of CO2 emitted by each source. 
According to the figures in Table 1, there is an uneven distribution of the annual emission volumes as 
the five largest emitters (Antwerp #1, Le Havre #1, #11, #2 and Antwerp #2) jointly generate 88% of 
the total emissions generated by the grand coalition AllN  whereas the share of the two smallest 
emitters (Le Havre #8, and #12) looks negligible. The case of these very small emitters deserves a 
discussion. Recently, some concerns have emerged regarding the efficiency of an Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) based on a “blanket coverage” that includes all the industrial emitters of greenhouse 
19 
gases in an economy.17 As a result, the EU Commission has taken some steps toward a “partial 
coverage” scheme whereby emitters that do not attain a threshold level of 25,000 tCO2 per year are 
exempted from the ETS. In case of a “partial coverage” scheme, the two smallest emitters are 
eliminated from the list of potential CCS adopters and denote 
225ktCO
N≥  the coalition of emitters with 
an annual emission level greater than the threshold. In this case study, we are going to systematically 
contrast the results obtained with the two possible extent of coverage in an ETS, i.e., the two possible 
definitions of the grand coalition N , either AllN  or 225ktCON≥ .  
Third, within-year variations in CO2 emissions are of importance as the emission load factor 
influences the gauging of a pipeline system. Because of data availability issues, the analysis 
concentrates on the between-quarter variability in the hourly CO2 flow rates. The quarterly emission 
figures detailed Table 1 confirm that there are marked differences in the within-year patterns of 
emissions as some facilities emit a steady flow of CO2 during the whole year (e.g., Antwerp #1 & #2) 
whereas others have significant within-year variations (e.g., Le Havre #1). Hereafter, we denote iq  
the within-year peak hourly flow emitted by the industrial facility i .   
b – Cost data 
In this paper, we use the data detailed in Table 1 for the site-specific, annual unit cost of the 
capture equipments and the gathering lines connecting the industrial facilities to the CO2 trunkline 
system (collection). The annual unit cost for offshore CO2 storage in the North Sea is assumed to be 
equal to 8 €/tCO2 per year. This figure is based on the estimates reported in IPCC (2005). 
Regarding CO2 pipeline transportation, a detailed engineering economic model based on McCoy 
(2009) has been put to work to determine the optimal combination of parameters (pipeline diameter, 
operating pressures, etc) that minimizes the annual total cost to install and operate an adapted pipeline 
system for each possible coalition of emitters in the largest coalition AllN  (cf. Appendix A). The CO2 
trunkline at hand can be decomposed into two subsystems (cf. Figure 1): a first pipeline system 
connects Le Havre to Antwerp and a second pipeline system connects Antwerp to the Rotterdam area. 
Thus, for any coalition of CCS adopters S  with AllS N⊂ , the annual long-run total cost ( )C S  to 
build and operate an adapted pipeline infrastructure is: ( ) ( ) ( )F B B NLC S C S F C S→ →= ∩ + , where 
( )F BC S F→ ∩  is the cost to transport the volume ii S F Q∈ ∩  of CO2 from Le Havre to Antwerp and 
( )B NLC S→  is the cost to transport the volumes ii S Q∈  from Antwerp to Rotterdam.  
In Table 2, we report the total annual costs of the components of an adapted CCS infrastructure 
for some attention-grabbing coalitions of emitters. According to this engineering process model, the 
annual total cost to install and operate an adapted pipeline system capable of transporting the CO2 
                                                 
17
 For example, the benefit–cost analysis conducted by Betz et al. (2010) indicated that a “partial coverage” solely focused 
on the largest emitters could generate substantial social cost savings. 
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emitted by the largest set of emitters AllN  is €123.8 million which represents 10.5% of the total annual 
cost of the whole CCS chain. For that grand coalition AllN , the average annual total cost of the whole 
CCS chain is 59.9 €/(tCO2 per year), of which solely 6.29 €/(tCO2 per year) are related to the CO2 
pipeline system. Because of its location, the coalition B  that gathers the two Belgian emitters 
provides the lowest average total cost figure: 55.9 €/(tCO2 per year), of which 2.47 €/(tCO2 per year) 
are related to the CO2 pipeline system. 
Table 2. The stand-alone cost of the CCS infrastructure for some remarkable coalitions 
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Note: All cost figures are in 2010 euros.  
4.2 Preliminary insights 
a - The cost structure of the CO2 pipeline project 
To begin with, we discuss the cost structure of the CO2 pipeline project at hand. An exhaustive 
series of verifications confirms that the engineering-based cost function C  at hand is sub-additive, 
which confirms the natural monopolistic nature of that infrastructure.18 
Now, we focus on the sustainable nature of that natural monopoly. The conditions for 
sustainability have been tested using the linear program LP1 and several alternative definitions of the 
grand coalition N  including: the case of a “blanket coverage” based on the largest coalition (i.e., 
AllN N= ), those of a “partial coverage” using the restricted coalition (i.e., 225ktCON N≥= ), and those 
of a stand-alone policy including solely the Belgian emitters. In Table 3, we report the optimal value 
of the objective function *ε  obtained while solving LP1 with these different definitions of N . 
In each case, *ε  has a strictly positive value which indicates that the core of the associated cost-
sharing game is a non-empty set. Hence, each of these possible grand coalitions N  represents a stable 
club because, in each case, there exists at least one core cost allocation that guarantees that no emitter 
                                                 
18
 As a side remark, our numerical investigations also indicate that the cost-sharing game at hand is not convex. Recall that  
a convex cost game is characterized by the property: { }( ) ( ) { }( ) ( )C S i C S C T i C T∪ − ≥ ∪ −  for all S , 
AllT N⊂  and all Alli N∈  with { }\AllS T N i⊂ ⊆  (Shapley, 1971). 
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or subgroup of emitters has an incentive to drop out and go for a stand-alone infrastructure. We are 
thus dealing with a sustainable natural monopoly.  
Table 3. The solution of LP1 for various definition of the grand coalition N  
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As a side comment, we can mention that the optimal values attained by the objective function of 
the linear program LP1 suggest that the cores of these cost games are not large. For example, the 
creation of a unique infrastructure capable of serving the largest coalition AllN  can provide the least 
well-off subgroup of emitters with a transmission cost economy that may attain €572 thousand per 
year compared to a stand-alone policy. Arguably, that least well-off subgroup contains at least one 
small emitter since the value of *ε  raises to 708 k€/yr when considering the case of a “partial 
coverage” (i.e., the restricted cost game ( )225 ,ktCON C≥ ). 
b - A benefit-based approach 
We now proceed analyzing the associated benefit-sharing game. Again, we consider the 
preceding list of possible clubs of emitters (i.e., definitions of the grand coalition N ). For each of 
them, we determine: (i) the minimum selling price of an emission allowance 
2CO
p  required to obtain 
the voluntary adoption of the CCS technology by all the members in N  (cf. the definition in (11)), 
and (ii) the minimum selling price of an emission allowance 
2
*
COp  required for the existence of an 
incentive-compatible allocation of the total net benefit generated by the CO2 trunkline system.  
These results are reported in Table 4. In all these clubs, the condition (10) for a voluntary 
adoption of the CCS technology by all club members requires a carbon price level 
2CO
p  that is 
significantly larger than the average total cost of the CCS chain. This finding has important policy 
implications for the deployment of CCS technologies. Indeed, most of the engineering-based studies 
seek to evaluate the average total cost of plausible CCS chains and implicitly assume that it gives the 
minimum selling price of an emission allowance required for the abatement of these volumes of CO2. 
Yet, our finding indicates that this engineering approach can significantly underestimate the price at 
which CCS will be adopted by the grand coalition at stake. For example, below a CO2 price of 66.8 
€/t, there is no way to obtain the adhesion of all emitters in AllN  to the infrastructure project. The 
difference between that price level and the average total cost of the whole CCS chain is larger than 6.9 
22 
€/(tCO2 per year) and clearly matters as it represents 110% of the average total cost of the CO2 
pipeline system.  
Table 4. The minimum prices of CO2 required to organize a club of certain size 
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Note: All figures are in 2010 euros.  
Interestingly, in all these clubs, the condition for the existence of an incentive-compatible 
allocation of the total net benefit generated by the pipeline system imposes a minimum allowance 
price 
2
*
COp  that is identical to 2COp . In each of these cases, the core of the cost-sharing game at hand 
is large enough to allow the pipeline operator to pick a cost allocation that charges each emitter i  a 
revenue ir  that does not exceed ( )2CO i ip Qχ σ− −  i.e., its willingness to pay for CO2 pipeline service 
at a carbon price equal to 
2CO
p . Hence, these figures suggest that imposing the pipeline operator to 
use cross-subsidy free prices does not impact the adoption of the CSS technology.  
Last but not least, a few words can be added on the absolute levels of these prices. These absolute 
thresholds, although relatively high compared to values of the carbon prices nowadays, do not seem 
unattainable in the mid-run. For example, the IEA carbon price assumptions used in IEA (2011), range 
from $45 to $120 (USD 2010) per ton by 2035.19  
4.3 An analysis of some conceivable tariffs structures 
In the sequel of this paper, we analyze a series of plausible tariffs structure that could be imposed 
on the CO2 pipeline operator. Inspired by the natural gas analogue, the discussion focuses on two main 
classes of tariffs structures. First, we present the so-called 'postage stamp' pricing systems that consists 
of determining a uniform toll structure that is levied on all the injection points to the pipeline system 
(Hewicker and Kesting, 2009). In the European natural gas industry, the implementation of such 
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 A much more voluntarist scenario – 450ppm – from IEA (2011) yields much higher carbon values in 2035, at 120 
USD2010  per ton. 
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pricing systems is usually motivated by their simplicity and their perceived fairness.20 Yet, it compels 
charging the same rate irrespective of the location of the CO2 emitters and thus neglects spatial issues. 
So, we also consider a second class of pricing systems that reflects a third-degree price discrimination 
based on location.  
In this subsection, we first detail these two series of conceivable tariffs before discussing the 
results. 
a – 'Postage stamp' pricing systems  
We introduce three types of 'postage stamp' tariffs (simple linear tariffs, unique multi-part tariffs, 
and a menu of multipart tariffs) and detail for each type some possible implementations. For the sake 
of brevity, all these tariffs are summarized in Table 5. 
Simple linear tariffs 
To begin with, we focus on the simplest case: a single-part unit price. We analyze two possible 
pricing schemes. In the first one (Tariff #PS1), the revenue charged to each emitter is obtained using a 
supplementary real decision variable: Qt  which is the transportation price per unit volume of CO2 
transported. In the second one (Tariff #PS2), we assume that emitters are required to pay for the 
maximum capacity (i.e., the peak flow rate of their emissions) given a unit price qt  per unit of 
capacity. 
A unique multipart linear tariff 
As the 'postage stamp' tariff structures used for natural gas pipelines typically combine several 
elements, we also consider three two-parts tariffs. In Tariff #PS3, the revenue charged to each emitter 
includes a fixed charge f  and a volume-related term based on the unit price Qt . Tariff #PS4 is similar 
except that the volume-related component is replaced by a capacity-related one using the unit capacity 
price qt . Tariff #PS5 corresponds to another variation where there are no fixed charges but the 
pipeline operator is let free to charge a price per unit of volume transported and a price per unit of 
capacity. 
A menu of multipart tariffs 
As it is conceivable to combine a 'postage stamp' tariff structure with a second-degree price 
discrimination scheme, we also analyze the case where the pipeline operator is allowed to create a 
menu of two two-part tariffs. Such a menu could take into consideration the fact that there are marked 
differences in the transportation services required by the different users. 
                                                 
20
 Regarding the case of natural gas pipelines, we refer to David and Percebois (2004) for a presentation of the 'postage 
stamp' pricing system implemented in Denmark, Spain, Finland, and Sweden. 
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Table 5. 'Postage stamp' pricing systems  
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b – Location-specific pricing systems   
Location can be used as an objective attribute to implement a third-degree price discrimination. 
So, we now assume that the pipeline operator is allowed to charge possibly different tariffs depending 
on the location of each emitters.  
Compared to the non-discriminatory cases above, one can expect that a third degree price 
discrimination provides the pipeline operator with an enlarged feasible set for its pricing policy. To 
what extent can this relaxation contribute to the creation of a large club of CCS users? To gain insight 
on that issue, one may compare the solutions obtained with each of the 'postage stamp' tariff structures 
above and those obtained with their location-specific analogue denoted Tariff #LS1 to Tariff #LS8 (cf. 
Table 6). For the sake of clarity, the location-dependent tariff parameters are superscripted with B  
(respectively F ) for Belgian (respectively French) emitters. 
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Table 6. Location-specific pricing systems 
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Note: * As (i) there are only two emitters located in Belgium and (ii) there are no seasonal variations in their emission 
patterns, it is not possible to determine a unique menu of two two-part tariffs for Belgian emitters. Thus, we assumed that a 
unique tariff is implemented in Belgium. 
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c – Results 
We have successively implemented these tariffs structures within the programs LP3 or MILP6. In 
Table 7 (respectively Table 8), we report the results obtained when solving these programs for the 
grand coalition of emitters AllN  (respectively 225ktCON≥ ). Several observations can be made from these 
results.  
Table 7. The computed threshold CO2 prices for the grand coalition AllN    
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Note:  The results reported in the rows (a) were obtained using the linear program LP3. Those reported in the rows (b) have 
been generated using the mixed integer linear program MILP6. In this table,    indicates that the solution set is empty. All 
figures are in 2010 euros.  
First, spatial issues matter! Indeed, the implementation of a 'postage stamp' pricing system that 
neglects the emitters' difference in locations systematically impedes the adoption of a common CO2 
transportation infrastructure. Our investigations confirm that such a tariff system would clearly 
penalize the Belgian emitters because they would be charged an amount larger than the stand-alone 
cost to construct a dedicated pipeline system gauged for these two emitters. That's why, in the sequel 
of this paper, we focus solely on location-specific pricing systems and no longer refer to the 'postage 
stamp' pricing systems. 
Second, the obligation to use a non-discriminatory pricing scheme for the pipeline component is 
non-neutral on the minimum incentive-compatible value of the carbon price. No matter what definition 
is adopted for the grand coalition (either AllN  or 225ktCON≥ ), the minimum carbon price values 2
**
COp  
reported in Tables 7 and 8 are systematically larger than the corresponding value 
2
*
COp  obtained with 
discriminatory pipeline tariffs (cf. the values reported in Table 4). The difference ( )2 2** *CO COp p−  is 
directly attributable to the use of a given non-discriminatory tariff and can be used to provide guidance 
in the design of a pricing scheme. In the worst case (the multipart capacity-based tariff #LS4 with the 
27 
largest possible coalition AllN ), that difference attains 11.24 €/(tCO2 per year), that is 1.8 times the 
average cost of the pipeline system in that configuration.  
Third, designing a non-discriminatory pipeline tariff compatible with the widest possible 
adoption of CCS technologies is a difficult task! According to the results detailed in Table 7, very few 
tariffs (only the multipart tariffs #LS4 and #LS7 based on a fixed charge and a capacity-based 
component) verify the conditions for a non-empty feasible set for the programs LP3 or MILP6. This 
finding suggests that imposing a poorly-defined, non-discriminatory, pricing scheme (e.g., a volume-
based tariff) is likely to hamper the construction of a CCS chain capable to capture the emissions of all 
these 14 plants. In contrast, Table 8 indicates that achieving a “partial coverage” is less restrictive (as 
six tariffs out of eight are compatible with a non-empty feasible set for the programs LP3 or MILP6). 
Given the limited environmental impact of the two smallest emitters, this finding questions the 
relevance of a “blanket coverage” target for the CCS infrastructure. 
Table 8. The computed threshold CO2 prices for the grand coalition 225ktCON≥    
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Note:  The results reported in the rows (a) were obtained using the linear program LP3. Those reported in the rows (b) have 
been generated using the mixed integer linear program MILP6. In this table,    indicates that the solution set is empty. All 
figures are in 2010 euros. 
Lastly, it is interesting to compare the minimum carbon price 
2
**
COp  obtained when using a menu 
of two-part tariffs to those obtained when a unique two-part tariff is implemented (e.g., Tariff #LS4 vs. 
Tariff #LS7, or Tariff #LS5 vs. Tariff #LS8). No matter what definition is adopted for the grand 
coalition N , the obtained prices 
2
**
COp  are systematically identical. This indicates that imposing such a 
second-degree price discrimination schemes does not at all ease the adoption of the CCS technology. 
We are going to argue that this seemingly surprising result is not that surprising! Indeed, the analysis 
of the solutions of the mathematical programs MILP6 confirms that the two optimum tariffs are 
identical. Intuitively, this outcome suggests that the pipeline operator cannot offer some volume or 
28 
capacity related rebates to “large” users without charging extra revenue to the “small” users (recall 
that the pipeline operator has to recover its costs). Interestingly, these “small” users are typically those 
with the lowest willingness to pay per (either volume or capacity) unit of CO2 pipeline service and are 
thus the ones with a binding participation constraint... 
4.4 National vs. supranational regulation for the CO2 pipeline industry 
The infrastructure at hand has a transnational nature, which raises a policy issue: “Should the 
regulation of that infrastructure be organized at the national level or at the EU-level?” To address this, 
we can check whether or not the implementation of national regulatory constraints has an influence on 
the minimum price of the CO2 emission allowance 2
**
COp .  
In the preceding subsection, we implicitly disregarded these national aspects. So, we now 
suppose that there exists two local (i.e., national) regulators and that each of them has an exclusive 
competence to regulate the pricing structure used by the pipeline operator in its jurisdiction. To 
simplify, we assume that: (i) there is one regulator in charge of the pipeline subsystem connecting Le 
Havre to Antwerp, and another one in charge of those connecting Antwerp to Rotterdam; (ii) the 
pipeline operator is required to maintain a distinct accounting system for each territory; (iii) each 
regulator demands that the revenues obtained in its jurisdiction recover exactly the total cost incurred 
on that territory; and (iv) these revenues are cross-subsidy-free. 
The modeling framework above (cf. the linear program LP3) can easily be modified to address 
that case. This gives us the linear program LP7: 
LP7: 
2, , , ,
Min
F B B NL F B B NL COr r t t p→ → → →
 
2CO
p         (60) 
s.t. F B F Br → →∈ Λ ,         (61) 
 B NL B NLr → →∈ Λ ,        (62) 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 2 2, , , , : 0COF NF B B NL CO F B B NL CO pr r p r r p F r→ → → → +∈ ∈ × ∈ ≥   , (63) 
( ),F B F B F Br t→ → →∈Ω ,        (64) 
( ),B NL B NL B NLr t→ → →∈Ω ,       (65) 
where: F Br →  (respectively B NLr → ) denotes the revenue vector charged by the pipeline operator to 
the French emitters for using the pipeline subsystem connecting Le Havre to Antwerp (respectively 
Antwerp to Rotterdam); the set F B→Λ  (respectively B NL→Λ ) denotes the core of the cost game 
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( ), F BF C →  (respectively ( ), B NLN C → ); ( )2COpF r  is the vector where the i th component is the 
individual benefit of emitter i   i.e., ( )( )
2, COi p F B B NL i
F r r→ →+  if i F∈  and ( )( )2, COi p B NL iF r →   if 
i B∈  and the set F B→Ω  (respectively B NL→Ω ) describes the tariff structure implemented for the 
pipeline subsystem connecting Le Havre to Antwerp (respectively Antwerp to Rotterdam). The 
conditions (61) and (62) compels the pipeline operator to adopt, for each jurisdiction, a cross-subsidy-
free pricing policy that recovers exactly the exact total cost incurred on that territory. The conditions 
(63) represents the emitters' individual participation constraints and the conditions (64) (respectively 
(65)) describes the pricing scheme imposed by the French (respectively Belgian) regulator. 
In Table 9, we report 
2
**
COp the minimum price of CO2obtained while solving the linear program 
LP7 with a feasible multipart linear tariff similar to #LS4 for each of the two possible definitions of 
the grand coalition (either AllN  or 225ktCON≥ ). With this first tariff structure, both regulators compel 
the use of a two-part tariff based on a fixed term and a capacity component. 
Table 9. The tariff-specific threshold CO2 prices in case of national-based regulation  
2
7 
AllN  
2
**
COp 
$  
225ktCO
N≥  
2
**
COp 
$  
2
&8
( ),B Ff f  
 ( ),B Fq qt t 
:&

78
B B
i i qr f q t= + ; i B∀ ∈ ; **
( ) ( )B B F Fi i iq qr f q t f q t= + + + ; i F∀ ∈ ,*)
)-,-* *),/)
Note:  These results were obtained using the linear program LP7. All carbon price figures are in 2010 euros.  
The comparison of the results reported in Table 9 with those in Table 7 and Table 8 (cf. Tariff 
LS#4) indicates that a collection of national regulations systematically imposes a net increase in the 
minimum CO2 price required for the adoption of the CCS technology (compared to a regulation 
organized at the EU-level). Though, that net increase remains modest (+0.82 €/tCO2 in case of a 
“blanket coverage”, and +0.14 €/tCO2 in case of a partial one). These modest increases suggest that 
the institutional scope (national vs. European) of the tariff regulation imposed on the pipeline 
operators may not play a major role compared to the detailed design of a CO2 pipeline pricing scheme. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The question of how to design an appropriate regulatory framework for CO2 pipeline systems is 
one of the key design issues that regulators and policy makers across the world will have to address to 
clarify the conditions for the deployment of a large-scale CCS industry. In this paper, we analyze the 
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role played by pipeline-related regulations on the emitter's decision to adopt the CCS technology and 
thus share the common CO2 pipeline cost.  
The challenge of this paper is to specify an adapted modeling framework that has its roots in the 
cooperative game theoretic treatment of clubs. Our approach explicitly takes into consideration the 
main features of the CCS club: the heterogeneity of the likely club members (differences in the 
emitter-specific capture costs, in their location, in the size of their annual emissions and in their infra-
annual patterns of emissions) and an engineering-based model of the long-run cost to build and 
operate a CO2 pipeline. We believe that this model-based approach is able to provide valuable 
guidance for the decision makers involved in the institutional design of the CO2 pipeline industry.  
A case study focusing on a Northwestern European CO2 pipeline project provided us with an 
opportunity to obtain a series of original findings. First, a preliminary cost-based analysis has 
confirmed that a CO2 pipeline system constitutes a sustainable natural monopoly. Accordingly, one 
can rightly expect the pipeline operator to adopt a pricing policy that insures that none of the possible 
subcoalitions of emitters has an incentive to drop out the grand coalition and build an alternative 
infrastructure. Second, a benefit-based perspective confirms that the minimum selling price of an 
allowance required to obtain the voluntary adoption of the CCS technology by all the emitters (i.e., the 
price related to Sharkey's participation condition) is significantly larger than the average cost of the 
entire CCS chain. Third, we have analyzed a series of non-discriminatory pricing schemes that may 
conceivably be imposed on the pipeline operator. Interestingly, our findings confirm that the design of 
these pipeline access charges is non neutral on the adoption of the CCS technology. For example, the 
results reveal that the emitter's location must be taken into consideration in the design of a pricing 
scheme and that a poorly designed pricing scheme can either: significantly raise the minimum price of 
an emission allowance capable of justifying the construction of the pipeline system, or even impede 
the construction of that infrastructure. Lastly, we have compared the outcomes obtained in case of a 
pricing regulation organized at the EU-level to those obtained with a collection of national regulations. 
Our findings indicate that the scope of the regulation does not significantly impact the adoption of the 
CCS technology. Although our discussion is centered on this specific project, it should be clear that 
the methodology detailed hereafter could apply to other CO2 pipeline projects as well. 
As in any modeling effort, we made some simplifying assumptions. The main one is related to 
the grandfathering allocation of emission rights. Recent proposals for the Phase III of the European 
Union Emission Trading Scheme call for a substantial modification of the grandfathering allocation of 
emission rights. Such a change can modify the emitter's individual incentive to adopt the CCS 
technology and constitutes an attractive agenda for future research. 
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Appendix A  
Proof of Proposition 1 (Sharkey 1982) 
If ( )2COy p∈Γ , then (13) indicates that, for any S N⊂ , we have 
( ) ( ) ( )2 221, ,COCO i i i p i COi S p Q F y v S pχ σ −∈  	− − − ≥
  . Using (9) and rearranging, we obtain that 
( ) ( )
2
1
, COi p ii S
F y C S−
∈
≤  for any S N⊂ . Besides, if 2 2CO COp p≥  we have 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2, CO CO i ii Nv N p p Q C Nχ σ∈  	= − − −
  . Hence, any ( )2COy p∈Γ  implies that 
( ) ( )
2
1
, COi p ii N
F y C N−
∈
=  and thus ( )
2
1
COp
F y− ∈ Λ .                  Q.E.D.  
Proof of Lemma 1 
The proof requires two independent steps.  
STEP #1:  Assume a given ( )2COy p∈Γ . By definition, y  verifies both: 
( )2,i CO
i N
y v N p
∈
= ,         (A.1)
 ( )2,i CO
i S
y v S p
∈
≥ ,   S N∀ ⊂ .      (A.2) 
Because of the definition (9), we clearly have ( ) ( ) ( )2 2, CO CO i i
i S
v S p p Q C Sχ σ
∈
 	≥ − − −
   for each 
S N⊂ . Besides, we know that ( )2, 0COv S p ≥  for any S N⊂  which confirms that Ny +∈ . Hence, 
we have verified that ( )2COy p∈ ϒ  and thus  ( ) ( )2 2CO COp pΓ ⊆ ϒ . 
STEP #2:  Now, assume a given ( )2COy p∈ ϒ . By definition, y  verifies both (A.1) and:  
( ) ( )2i CO i i
i S i S
y p Q C Sχ σ
∈ ∈
 	≥ − − −
   ,   S N∀ ⊂ .   (A.3) 
For each S N⊂  and any { }\ ,R S N⊂ ∅ , we have: R S<  and thus i ii S i Ry y∈ ∈≥   because 
N
y +∈ . As ( )2COy p∈ ϒ , the condition (A.3) holds for each coalition { }\ ,R S N⊂ ∅  and thus:   
( ) ( )2i CO i ii R i Ry p Q C Rχ σ∈ ∈  	≥ − − −
   . Hence, we have for any coalition S N⊂ : 
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( ) ( )2i CO i i
i S i R
y p Q C Rχ σ
∈ ∈
 	≥ − − −
   ,   { }\ ,R S N∀ ⊂ ∅ .   (A.4) 
The inequalities (A.3) and (A.4) jointly indicate that: 
( ) ( )2Maxi CO i i
R Si S i R
y p Q C Rχ σ
⊆∈ ∈
  	≥ − − − 
  
  ,  S N∀ ⊆ .   (A.5) 
As a result, we have ( )2COy p∈Γ  which proves that ( ) ( )2 2CO COp pϒ ⊆ Γ . To conclude, we have 
proven that ( ) ( )2 2 .CO COp pϒ = Γ         
                       Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
Again, the proof requires two independent steps.  
STEP #1:  Assume a given cost allocation ( ){ }
2
: 0
CO
N
pr r F r∈ Λ ∩ ∈ ≥ . By definition, r  verifies 
( )
2
0
COp
F r ≥ .  
By construction, r  verifies the condition (3) and thus 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2CO i i i CO i ii N i Np Q r p Q C Nχ σ χ σ∈ ∈ 	  	− − − = − − −
  
   . As 2 2CO COp p≥ , we have: 
( ) ( )22 ,COp i COi N F r v N p∈ = .       
By construction, r also verifies the condition (2) which indicates that, for any S N⊂ , the inequality 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2CO i i i CO i ii S i Sp Q r p Q C Sχ σ χ σ∈ ∈ 	  	− − − ≥ − − −
  
    holds and thus: 
( ) ( ) ( )22COp i CO i ii S i SF r p Q C Sχ σ∈ ∈  	≥ − − −
   . 
Hence, we have verified all the conditions for ( ) ( )22COp COF r p∈ ϒ . Applying the result stated in 
Lemma 1 and using a set-based notation allows us to write:  
( ){ }( ) ( )22 2: 0CO CONp p COF r F r pΛ ∩ ∈ ≥ ⊆ Γ .     (A.6) 
STEP #2:  Now, assume a given incentive-compatible allocation ( )2COy p∈Γ . Then, Lemma 1 
indicates that ( )2COy p∈ ϒ . Now, consider the cost allocation ( )21COpF y− .  
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As 
N
y +∈ , the allocation verifies ( ) ( ){ }2 21 : 0CO CONp pF y r F r− ∈ ∈ ≥ . Besides, we assumed that 
2 2CO CO
p p≥  so using Proposition 1, ( )
2
1
COp
F y− ∈ Λ . Thus, ( ) ( ){ }
2 2
1 : 0
CO CO
N
p pF y r F r
− ∈ Λ ∩ ∈ ≥ . 
By construction, ( )( ) ( ){ }( )2 2 2 21 : 0CO CO CO CONp p p pF F y F r F r− ∈ Λ ∩ ∈ ≥  which proves that:  
( )( )( ) ( ){ }( )22 2 2 21 : 0CO CO CO CONp p CO p pF F p F r F r− Γ ⊆ Λ ∩ ∈ ≥ .   (A.7) 
As 
2 2
1
CO COp p
F F −  is equal to the identity function, (A.7) can be rewritten as    
( ) ( ){ }( )2 2 2: 0CO CONCO p pp F r F rΓ ⊆ Λ ∩ ∈ ≥  which complete the second step.  
To conclude, we have proven that:   ( ) ( ){ }( )2 2 2: 0CO CONCO p pp F r F rΓ = Λ ∩ ∈ ≥ .           Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 3 
To begin with, we have to show that there exists a solution to LP2. For any r ∈ Λ , the condition (2) 
imposes some bounds on the individual revenues. Thus, the individual benefits verify: 
( ) ( ) { }( )22, COi p i CO i iF r p Q C iχ σ≥ − − −  for any i . As a result, any price 2COp  with 
{ }( ){ }2 MaxCO i N i ip C i Qχ σ∈≥ + +  verifies the conditions for ( )2 0COpF r ≥  and thus the 
conditions for a non-empty feasible set for the program LP2. 
Now, we consider a solution ( )2* *,COp r  of LP2. By construction, 2*COp  is unique and 
( ){ }*
2
* : 0
CO
N
p
r r F r∈ ∈ ≥ . Thus, for any coalition of players S N⊂ , we have: 
( )2* *CO i i ii S i Sp Q rχ σ∈ ∈ 	− − ≥
   .       (A.8) 
Using the fact that * * *
\i i ii S i N i N S
r r r
∈ ∈ ∈
= −    and remarking that *r ∈ Λ , we can write:  
( ) ( )* \ii S r C N C N S∈ ≥ − .        (A.9) 
Combining (A.8) and (A.9) and rearranging is sufficient to conclude that 
2 2
*
CO COp p≥ .  
                       Q.E.D.  
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Appendix B - The long-run total cost function, an engineering model  
In this Appendix, we clarify the methodology used to evaluate the long-run total cost of a CO2 
trunkline system (e.g., from Le Havre to Antwerp and from Antwerp to Rotterdam).  
From a technological perspective, the CO2 trunkline at hand can be decomposed into two 
subsystems: a first pipeline system connects Le Havre to Antwerp (distance 427 kilometers) and a 
second pipeline system connects Antwerp to the Rotterdam area (distance 164 kilometers). Each of 
these two subsystems can have a specific design (pipeline diameter; operating pressures...).  
For each subsystem, our cost estimates are based on the following hypotheses:  
 there are negligible differences in elevation along the projected routes; 
 the pipeline's lifetime is 30 years;  
 the real interest rate used in the analyses is 8.00%;21 
 the exchange rate used in the analysis is 1.30 USD = 1.00 Euro; 
 the future hourly flow rates of CO2 that will be transported during the plant's lifetime are 
known ex ante; 
 a one-year periodicity is assumed for these hourly flow rates so that the design of the 
infrastructure can be chosen so as to minimize the annual equivalent cost to transport the 
flows of CO2 observed during a typical year; 
 the terminal pressure at the delivery point is equal to those measured at the inlet of the system; 
 several compression stations can possibly be installed along the pipe. In that case, we follow 
the rule of thumb detailed in Chapon (1990) and implicitly used in McCoy (2009, chapter 2)22 
and assume: (i) that there is a unique pipe-diameter for each subsystem; (ii) that these 
compression stations are regularly spaced along the pipeline; and (iii) that all these 
compression stations are operated at the same regime so that a unique compression ratio is 
used for all the compressors installed along the pipeline.23  
 the size of the compressor equipments is imposed by the peak hourly flow rate, but on a given 
hour, their rate of use (and thus, the variable cost of the energy required to power these 
equipments during that hour) is imposed by that hour's output. The amount of energy required 
                                                 
21
 To our knowledge, there is no foolproof way of choosing this rate. This figure is coherent with those typically used in 
Northwestern Europe for natural gas pipelines.  
22
 A pipeline expert might argue that some of these hypotheses could be relaxed to obtain a slightly lower cost (e.g., the 
assumption of equally spaced stations as in André and Bonnans, 2011). Nevertheless, we proceed assuming that this 
engineering-based model conveys a sufficient level of sophistication to capture the essential features of the technology of a 
CO2 trunkline system. 
23
 Thus, the whole subsystem can be described as a sequence of identical elementary modules (each module includes a 
compressor station and a pipeline segment) that are serially connected one to the other. 
38 
for compression purposes is obtained using the engineering relations detailed in McCoy 
(2009, subsection 2.1.3 and Appendix A). 
These hypotheses together with the engineering process model detailed in McCoy (2009) allows 
us to compute, for any vector of future hourly flow rates of CO2, the long-run cost-minimizing design 
of a point-to-point CO2 pipeline infrastructure (i.e., the optimal value of the pipeline diameter, the 
number and the size of the compressor stations, the amount of energy used for compression purposes).  
